Hazard interactions and interaction networks (cascades) within multi-hazard methodologies by Gill, Joel C. & Malamud, Bruce D.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.5194/esd-7-659-2016
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Gill, J. C., & Malamud, B. D. (2016). Hazard interactions and interaction networks (cascades) within multi-hazard
methodologies. Earth System Dynamics, 7(3), 659-679. 10.5194/esd-7-659-2016
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
Earth Syst. Dynam., 7, 659–679, 2016
www.earth-syst-dynam.net/7/659/2016/
doi:10.5194/esd-7-659-2016
© Author(s) 2016. CC Attribution 3.0 License.
Hazard interactions and interaction networks (cascades)
within multi-hazard methodologies
Joel C. Gill and Bruce D. Malamud
Department of Geography, King’s College London, London, WC2R 2LS, UK
Correspondence to: Joel C. Gill (joel.gill@kcl.ac.uk)
Received: 22 December 2015 – Published in Earth Syst. Dynam. Discuss.: 19 January 2016
Revised: 11 May 2016 – Accepted: 25 May 2016 – Published: 23 August 2016
Abstract. This paper combines research and commentary to reinforce the importance of integrating hazard in-
teractions and interaction networks (cascades) into multi-hazard methodologies. We present a synthesis of the
differences between multi-layer single-hazard approaches and multi-hazard approaches that integrate such inter-
actions. This synthesis suggests that ignoring interactions between important environmental and anthropogenic
processes could distort management priorities, increase vulnerability to other spatially relevant hazards or un-
derestimate disaster risk. In this paper we proceed to present an enhanced multi-hazard framework through the
following steps: (i) description and definition of three groups (natural hazards, anthropogenic processes and tech-
nological hazards/disasters) as relevant components of a multi-hazard environment, (ii) outlining of three types
of interaction relationship (triggering, increased probability, and catalysis/impedance), and (iii) assessment of the
importance of networks of interactions (cascades) through case study examples (based on the literature, field ob-
servations and semi-structured interviews). We further propose two visualisation frameworks to represent these
networks of interactions: hazard interaction matrices and hazard/process flow diagrams. Our approach reinforces
the importance of integrating interactions between different aspects of the Earth system, together with human
activity, into enhanced multi-hazard methodologies. Multi-hazard approaches support the holistic assessment of
hazard potential and consequently disaster risk. We conclude by describing three ways by which understanding
networks of interactions contributes to the theoretical and practical understanding of hazards, disaster risk re-
duction and Earth system management. Understanding interactions and interaction networks helps us to better
(i) model the observed reality of disaster events, (ii) constrain potential changes in physical and social vulnerabil-
ity between successive hazards, and (iii) prioritise resource allocation for mitigation and disaster risk reduction.
1 Introduction
In this article we present both research and commentary to
support the integration of hazard interactions and their net-
works (cascades) into multi-hazard methodologies. Building
on the work of others (Delmonaco et al., 2007; Kappes et
al., 2010, 2012; Marzocchi et al., 2012; Gill and Malamud,
2014) we advocate for a multi-hazard approach that goes be-
yond the simple overlay of multiple single hazards to an ap-
proach that also encompasses interactions between these haz-
ards. We present here an enhanced framework for consider-
ing such interactions and integrating these into multi-hazard
methodologies, supporting efforts to improve management
of those aspects of the Earth system that are relevant to dis-
aster risk reduction. Examples from primary research and
published literature, together with commentary about multi-
hazard approaches, are included throughout.
Following this introduction, Sect. 2 examines the dif-
ferences between single-hazard, multi-layer single-hazard,
and full multi-hazard risk approaches. In Sect. 3 we de-
fine and describe three distinct hazard and process groups
(natural hazards, anthropogenic processes, technological
hazards/disasters) that can be considered in multi-hazard
methodologies. This is followed by Sect. 4, which discusses
and visualises three principal interaction relationships be-
tween these hazards and processes (triggering relationships,
increased-probability relationships, catalysis/impedance re-
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lationships), with a detailed description of their differences
and examples of each. Then in Sect. 5 we discuss how indi-
vidual interactions can join together to form networks of haz-
ard interactions (cascades), using four case studies (one from
Nepal and three from Guatemala) and two theoretical exam-
ples to consider different features of interaction networks and
how these can be visualised using hazard interaction matri-
ces and hazard/process flow diagrams. We also comment on
the benefits of assessing networks of hazard interactions to
support disaster risk reduction. Conclusions are outlined in
Sect. 6.
2 Multi-hazard risk assessments
2.1 Single vs. multi-hazard
Single-hazard approaches to assessing hazard potential, in
which hazards are treated as isolated and independent
phenomena, are commonplace. Their prevalence, however,
can distort management priorities, increase vulnerability to
other spatially relevant hazards or underestimate risk (Tobin
and Montz, 1997; ARMONIA, 2007; Kappes et al., 2010;
Budimir et al., 2014; Mignan et al., 2014). If a community is
susceptible to more than one hazard, management decisions
will benefit by reflecting the differential hazard potential and
risk from each of these, and not just focus on them as individ-
ual entities. Focusing on a small portion of the whole Earth
system, rather than the dynamics of its entirety, may result in
decisions being made that increase people’s vulnerability to
other, ignored hazards. The development of enhanced multi-
hazard risk approaches (integrating all aspects of hazard in-
teractions together with vulnerability and exposure) could of-
fer a way by which the disaster risk reduction community can
address these problems.
Multi-hazard approaches are widely encouraged in key
government and intergovernmental initiatives and agencies
but are rarely defined. For example, the Hyogo Framework
for Action (2005–2015) called for “an integrated multi-
hazard approach to disaster risk reduction” (UNISDR, 2005,
p. 4). The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
(2015–2030) states that “disaster risk reduction needs to be
multi-hazard” (UNISDR, 2015, p. 10). Despite the emphasis
on multi-hazard approaches within these international agree-
ments, both the Hyogo and Sendai frameworks do not define
what a multi-hazard approach involves. At the time of writ-
ing, the term multi-hazard also does not appear in the most
recent descriptions of terminology published by UNISDR
(2009). Further examples of multi-hazard approaches being
advocated for, but not clearly defined, can be found in United
Nations (2002) and Government Office for Science (2012).
The term multi-hazard may appear to be unambiguous to
some and not require a definition. It is, however, a term that
is frequently used in different contexts by different members
of the natural hazards and disaster risk reduction commu-
nity. It has been used to describe the independent analysis of
multiple different hazards (e.g. landslides, earthquakes, py-
roclastic density currents, tephra fall, flooding) relevant to
a given area (e.g. Granger et al., 1999; Perry and Lindell,
2008). It has also been used when referring to the identifi-
cation of areas of spatial overlap by superimposing hazard
layers (e.g. Dilley et al., 2005; Shi et al., 2015). These can be
better thought of as “multi-layer single-hazard” approaches
(Gill and Malamud, 2014), where an “all-hazards-at-a-place”
framework (Hewitt and Burton, 1971) seeks to understand
the discrete risks due to multiple natural hazards.
The identification of all possible and spatially relevant
hazards is an important feature of a full multi-hazard as-
sessment, but we believe it should not be the sole defining
characteristic of such an approach. Multi-hazard assessments
may also recognise the non-independence of natural hazards
(Kappes et al., 2010), noting that significant interactions ex-
ist between individual natural hazards. In a previous study
(Gill and Malamud, 2014) we took 21 different natural haz-
ards and identified 90 possible interactions between the 441
(21×21) combinations. Here, we will further consider (Sects.
3, 4) interactions that may also exist between natural hazards,
anthropogenic processes (human activity) and the built en-
vironment. We will also consider (Sect. 5) interactions that
can occur successively to form networks of hazard interac-
tions, also referred to as hazard cascades or chains (e.g. Xu
et al., 2014; Choine et al., 2015).
We now highlight five possible types of hazard interac-
tions that may occur if an inhabited location is susceptible to
multiple hazards, using four natural hazards (tropical storms,
floods, landslides and volcanic eruptions) as exemplars:
i. Natural hazards triggering other natural hazards: for
example, a tropical storm (primary natural hazard) may
trigger secondary natural hazards, such as flooding,
landslides or lahars if there has been a recent volcanic
eruption of tephra.
ii. Human activities triggering natural hazards: for exam-
ple, road construction may destabilise a slope and trig-
ger a landslide.
iii. Human activities exacerbating natural hazard trigger-
ing: for example, deforestation may exacerbate the trig-
gering of landslides or floods (secondary natural haz-
ards) during a tropical storm (primary natural hazard).
iv. Networks of hazard interactions (cascades): for ex-
ample, a tropical storm (primary natural hazard) may
trigger hundreds of landslides (second natural hazard),
some of which may dam rivers and exacerbate flood-
ing. This in turn could cause slope erosion and trigger
further landslides.
v. The concurrence of two (or more) hazard events: for ex-
ample, the spatial and temporal overlap of a volcanic
eruption and tropical storm event may result in flooding
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of a greater severity than would have occurred other-
wise, due to volcanic ash blocking drainage systems.
The above five interaction types, based on just four natural
hazard exemplars, are taken from a much broader range of
possible hazard interactions and their networks. Even with
these limited examples, they demonstrate the limitations of
assuming independence of single hazards within a multi-
layer single-hazard approach.
Multi-hazard methodologies, therefore, should ideally
evaluate all identified individual hazards relevant to a de-
fined spatial area and characterise all possible interactions
between these identified hazards. Figure 1, from Gill and
Malamud (2014), shows four distinct factors required to tran-
sition from a multi-layer single-hazard assessment to a de-
tailed, full multi-hazard risk assessment (which includes haz-
ard interactions, vulnerability and exposure). In addition to
identifying all hazards and their interactions, this working
framework also proposes an assessment of concurrent haz-
ards (such as a tropical storm and volcanic eruption coincid-
ing spatially and temporally), and the recognition that vul-
nerability is dynamic (which we discuss more in Sect. 5.3).
Many current hazard assessments that are labelled as
multi-hazard do not consider all the factors given in Fig. 1,
in either a qualitative or quantitative manner. This may be
a consequence of limited existing methodologies to assess
each of the steps proposed in Fig. 1 of a multi-hazard ap-
proach. Those methodologies that do exist are sometimes
complex, requiring significant amounts of data. Some ac-
cessible methodologies to allow the comparison of natural
hazards, however, can be found within the literature (e.g.
Granger et al., 1999; Van Westen et al., 2002; Greiving et
al., 2006; Grünthal et al., 2006; Marzocchi et al., 2009).
Methodologies to identify and visualise potential natural haz-
ard interactions also exist (e.g. Tarvainen et al., 2006; Han
et al., 2007; De Pippo et al., 2008; Kappes et al., 2010;
van Westen et al., 2014; Gill and Malamud, 2014; Liu et
al., 2016), including a progression towards more quantitative
approaches (e.g. Neri et al., 2013; Marzocchi et al., 2012).
In this paper, we will consider multi-hazard risk frameworks,
with a focus on the hazard interaction component of the risk
framework (and not so much of a focus on vulnerability and
exposure).
2.2 From global to local multi-hazard approaches
The hazard interactions literature outlined in Sect. 2.1 in-
cludes studies for different spatial extents, including global
(e.g. Gill and Malamud, 2014), continental (e.g. Tarvainen
et al., 2006) and local or sub-national (e.g. De Pippo et
al., 2008). The scale of interest for a particular multi-hazard
approach determines how interactions are characterised. Ap-
proaches may be based on an examination of an individual
event (e.g. a given earthquake triggering landslides in a given
region) or draw on a large population of individual events
Multi-layer single hazard
Multi-hazard
(1) Hazard identification and comparison. The identification and valid 
comparison of all identified individual hazards, relevant to a given spatial region.
(2) Hazard interactions. The identification and characterisation of all possible 
interactions between identified hazards.
(3) Hazard coincidence. An investigation into the impacts of two or more 
hazards coinciding spatially and/or temporally, such that the hazard potential 
and/or vulnerability may differ from the sum of its parts.
(4) Dynamic v  ulnerability. An understanding of how one, or a series of hazards, 
will impact upon the vulnerability and resilience of a community, thus changing 
the overall future risk to a location or community.
Figure 1. Multi-hazard risk framework (from Gill and Malamud,
2014). Shown is the progression from a multi-layer single-hazard
approach to a full multi-hazard risk approach that includes (i) haz-
ard identification and comparison, (ii) hazard interactions, (iii) spa-
tial/temporal coincidence of natural hazards, and (iv) dynamic vul-
nerability to multiple stresses (when progressing from the assess-
ment of hazard to the assessment of risk).
to infer the probabilistic behaviour of a relationship (e.g.
considering many earthquake-triggered landslide events over
different regions, and from this the dependence of the num-
ber of landslides triggered based on the earthquake magni-
tude). The latter approach is used to consider in general how
one hazard will influence another. Both approaches are bene-
ficial in different contexts. For example, a probabilistic view-
point is likely to support the characterisation of possible in-
teractions in a general, globally relevant way, as we often
consider them in our paper. When adapting global, multi-
hazard approaches for use in regional and local contexts, a
different population of individual events is required to infer
the probabilistic behaviour of a relationship specific to that
context. In many regions, although the database of events
is likely to better reflect site-specific conditions, it may be
small, consisting of just a few (sometimes zero) individual
events, depending on the period of time considered.
Another possible contrast between globally relevant multi-
hazard approaches and location-specific, multi-hazard ap-
proaches is the forecasting time window (Marzocchi et
al., 2012) or temporal resolution (Kappes et al., 2012). In
globally relevant approaches that draw upon many individ-
ual events, generalisations across forecasting time windows
(both short- and long-term time windows) are used to con-
struct the multi-hazard framework, with the inclusion of in-
teractions relevant at all temporal resolutions. When develop-
ing location-specific multi-hazard assessments, clear tempo-
ral limits should be established (Selva, 2013), depending on
the purpose of the multi-hazard approach. When constructing
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location-specific assessments of hazard potential, Marzocchi
et al. (2012) propose that the modelling of hazard interac-
tions is more necessary in the short term (e.g. hours to days)
than the long term (e.g. many decades to centuries). They ar-
gue that, in the short term, the occurrence of a primary haz-
ard (e.g. storms) can significantly modify the probability of
secondary hazards (e.g. floods, landslides), compared to the
long-term, where primary hazards (e.g. earthquakes, land-
slides) are already considered in the long-term assessment
of the secondary hazard (e.g. tsunamis). In other words, they
discuss that in a long-term perspective (e.g. the tsunami haz-
ard over the next 50 years), databases already contain infor-
mation of the fact that most tsunamis are triggered by earth-
quakes, and there is no need to make additional calculations
to calculate the long-term tsunami hazard. It is therefore less
necessary in the long term (compared to short term) to model
possible interactions as databases of past single-hazard oc-
currences already reflect the triggered nature of these haz-
ards. In the long term, however, it is important to consider the
temporal proximity of successively occurring hazards (e.g.
earthquake → tsunami) in order to better evaluate possible
risks and losses. We will further explore short-term and long-
term time windows (or time periods) in relation to natural
hazard interactions (primary hazard triggering a secondary
hazard) in Sect. 4.1. The importance of interactions in both
short- and long-term contexts can aid the understanding of
natural hazards, hazard education, communication and dis-
aster risk reduction.
As further multi-hazard approaches are developed, and in-
tegrated into research and practice, we believe that it is im-
portant to recognise that (i) natural hazards do not operate
in isolation, (ii) the characteristics of a framework at global
spatial scales may differ from more context/location-specific
scales, and (iii) enhanced multi-hazard approaches would
also likely benefit from considering how human activity can
influence the triggering of hazards and initiation of networks
of hazard interactions. We now proceed to define and de-
scribe three principal groups of hazards and processes that
enhanced multi-hazard frameworks may consider including.
3 Hazard and process groups
Here we discuss the characterisation of hazard potential
for an applied multi-hazard approach that includes an as-
sessment of at least three distinct groups: (i) natural haz-
ards, (ii) anthropogenic processes and (iii) technological haz-
ards/disasters. All of these can be considered to be processes
and/or phenomena with the potential to have negative im-
pacts on society. In the context of this article, these terms are
defined as follows:
i. Natural hazards: a natural process or phenomenon
that may have negative impacts on society (UNISDR,
2009). Examples include earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions, landslides, floods, subsidence, tropical storms and
wildfires.
ii. Anthropogenic processes: intentional human activity
that is non-malicious but that may have a negative im-
pact on society through the triggering or catalysing of
other hazardous processes. The word process here (and
used in many other places in the text) is taken to mean
a continuous and regular action or succession of actions
occurring or performed in a definite manner, and having
a particular result or outcome; a sustained operation
or series of operations (OED, 2015). Examples include
groundwater abstraction, vegetation removal, quarrying
and surface mining, urbanisation and subsurface con-
struction (tunnelling).
iii. Technological hazards/disasters: the unintentional, non-
malicious or negligent failure of technology or indus-
try. Examples include structural collapse, nuclear reac-
tor failure, urban fires, chemical pollution and dam col-
lapse.
A more detailed list of examples for each of these three
groups (natural hazards, anthropogenic processes, technolog-
ical hazards/disasters), based on the definitions set out above,
are given in Table 1. We now discuss in more detail (Sect. 3.1,
3.2, 3.3) each of these three groups, particularly potential
overlap between the groups anthropogenic process and tech-
nological hazard with additional brief comments in Sect. 3.4.
3.1 Natural hazards
The meaning of the phrase natural hazards, considered both
individually and as a group of processes, is reasonably well
understood (e.g. Alexander, 1993; Smith, 2013). The broad
definition of a natural hazard, as set out by UNISDR (2009),
is well accepted and encompasses those natural processes
that are widely considered to potentially have a negative im-
pact on society and the natural environment. Differences may
exist in the level of organisation, or the resolution of classifi-
cation, used to describe each single hazard. For example, in
their National Risk Register, the UK Cabinet Office (2013)
divides floods into coastal flooding and in-land flooding.
Differences may also exist in how single hazards are clus-
tered. For example, landslides may be clustered with other
single hazards within one or more of the following broader
hazard types: geophysical, geomorphological, hydrological,
and/or hydro-meteorological. These differences in resolution
of classification and clustering are normally due to different
purposes and characteristics of interest to a specific project,
rather than any significant differences of understanding in the
process.
3.2 Anthropogenic processes
Anthropogenic processes are less well defined and charac-
terised as a group, compared to the group labelled natural.
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Table 1. Examples of hazard/process types, grouped into three categories: natural hazards (classification of 21 hazards from Gill and Mala-
mud, 2014), anthropogenic processes and technological hazards/disasters.
Hazard/process group Examples
Natural hazards Earthquake, tsunami, volcanic eruption, landslide, snow avalanche, flood,
drought, regional subsidence, ground collapse, soil (local) subsidence,
ground heave, storm, tornado, hailstorm, snowstorm, lightning,
extreme temperature (hot and cold), wildfire, geomagnetic storm, impact event
Anthropogenic processes Groundwater abstraction, subsurface mining, subsurface construction, fluid injection,
vegetation removal, urbanisation, surface mining, drainage and dewatering,
reservoir construction, wastewater injection, chemical explosion
Technological hazards/disasters Structural collapse, nuclear reactor failure, urban fire,
chemical pollution, dam collapse, industrial explosion, transport accident
There are numerous references to individual human activities
exacerbating or triggering particular natural hazards in the
literature. For example, Owen et al. (2008) refer to the role
of road construction in exacerbating landslide initiation dur-
ing the 8 October 2005 Kashmir earthquake, Glade (2003)
refers to the role of land cover changes in the triggering of
landslides during rainstorms in New Zealand, and Knapen et
al. (2006) refer to the role of vegetation removal in trigger-
ing landslides in Uganda. Induced seismicity is a further ex-
ample of an anthropogenic process triggering a natural haz-
ard. Anthropogenic processes believed to induce seismicity
include reservoir construction (Simpson, 1976), groundwa-
ter abstraction (Gonzáles et al., 2012), and wastewater in-
jection (Ellsworth, 2013; Hough and Page, 2015). Each of
these examples involves an intentional, non-malicious hu-
man activity that has the potential to have a negative impact
on society through the triggering or catalysing of hazards.
UNISDR (2009) defines the occurrence of specific natural
hazards arising from overexploited or degraded natural re-
sources as “socio-natural” hazards. By definition, these are
generated by the interaction of anthropogenic processes with
the natural environment. The inclusion of anthropogenic pro-
cesses within multi-hazard approaches is therefore important
and justified. They are very relevant to the modelling of Earth
system dynamics and hazardous environments.
3.3 Technological hazards/disasters
Although often referred to in the context of disaster stud-
ies (e.g. Fleischhauer, 2006; Tarvainen et al., 2006; Bick-
erstaff and Simmons, 2009), technological hazards/disasters
are also less well defined and characterised than the group
natural hazards. Some definitions or descriptions of techno-
logical hazards and disasters do exist (e.g. Kasperson and Pi-
jawka, 1985; Gunn, 1990; UNISDR, 2009), but these often
lack clarity or they conflict with one another. For example,
some definitions include intentional anthropogenic activi-
ties within their definition of technological hazards/disasters.
Gunn (1990) refers to technological disasters as being
human-initiated consequences of breakdown, technical fault,
errors, or involuntary and voluntary human acts that have
negative consequences. The last of these approaches (vol-
untary human acts) includes those examples that we have
defined in Sect. 3.2 as anthropogenic processes. Subsurface
mining, for example, is a voluntary human act that can re-
sult in environmental damage, such as subsidence. This sub-
sidence can vary in intensity from slight to severe (Bell et
al., 2000).
The UNISDR (2009) definition of technological hazards
also states that hazards originate from technological or indus-
trial conditions, including human activities that may cause
environmental damage, health impacts, economic disruption
and other negative consequences. This could include human
activities such as subsurface mining, groundwater abstraction
and vegetation removal. Therefore, the UNISDR (2009) def-
inition of technological hazards also appears to include ex-
amples that we have categorised as anthropogenic processes.
Other authors make a clearer distinction between anthro-
pogenic processes and technological hazards. For example,
Kasperson and Pijawka (1985) outline three categories of
technological hazards:
i. Routine hazard events of technology, where there is ex-
posure to underlying chronic hazardous activity over an
extensive time period. These can normally be managed
by established procedures.
ii. Technology failures, resulting in the need for an emer-
gency response.
iii. Technological disasters, resulting in significant loss of
life or injury, social disruption or relocation.
The last two (technology failures, technological disasters)
are distinguished based on the scale of impact, with tech-
nological failures able to evolve into technological disasters
if losses are sufficiently large. Although included within the
broad category of technological hazards in Kasperson and Pi-
jawka (1985), there is significant overlap between their defi-
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nition of “routine hazard events of technology” and our def-
inition of anthropogenic processes, outlined in Sect. 3.2. For
example, in Table 1 we note surface mining to be an anthro-
pogenic process. This classification is based on our definition
of anthropogenic processes being intentional human activi-
ties that are non-malicious but may have a negative impact on
society through the triggering or catalysing of hazardous pro-
cesses (Sect. 3). Surface mining can also be considered to be
a “routine hazard event of technology” as defined by Kasper-
son and Pijawka (1985), in that the mining is a technological
process where there is exposure to underlying chronic haz-
ardous activity, which can be managed by established proce-
dures.
Whereas technological failures and disasters are generally
unintentional (i.e. not a result of a conscious choice or a
desired process), anthropogenic processes are generally in-
tentional and are a result of conscious decisions that may
subsequently result in negative consequences. Although such
consequences can often be managed using established proce-
dures, anthropogenic processes sometimes still result in the
triggering or catalysing of a natural hazard. In the context of
this article, therefore, technological hazards are taken to be
unintentional, non-malicious or negligent failures of technol-
ogy or industry.
3.4 Additional hazards or processes
In Sect. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 it was noted that both anthro-
pogenic processes and technological hazards/disasters are
non-malicious; the negative consequences are not the desired
outcome. Events that are malicious or deliberately destruc-
tive (e.g. terrorism, arson, aspects of warfare and criminal
activity) are not included within either anthropogenic pro-
cesses or technological hazards/disasters but may trigger the
occurrence of other hazards or processes. For example, the
deliberate and malicious detonation of a bomb close to a dam
(this is not an anthropogenic process, as it is malicious) may
trigger the dam to collapse (technological hazard), resulting
in substantial flooding (natural hazard).
In the context of the rest of this article we focus on inter-
action relationships between the three groups just discussed
– natural hazards, anthropogenic processes and technological
hazards/disasters – and the development of possible networks
of hazard interactions (cascades).
4 Interaction relationships
4.1 Classifying interaction types
Multiple interactions exist between the hazard and process
examples outlined in the three groups (natural hazards, an-
thropogenic processes, technological hazards/disasters) dis-
cussed above. Kappes et al. (2012) note a wide variety of
terms used to describe such interactions (e.g. interrelation-
ships, interconnections, coupled events) and specific sets of
interacting hazards (e.g. coinciding hazards, triggering ef-
fects). Here we continue to use the term interactions to de-
scribe the possible inter- and intra-relationships for hazards
and processes. We note that the term interaction commu-
nicates the potential for unidirectional and bidirectional re-
lationships. In unidirectional relationships first the primary
hazard occurs and then the secondary hazard. An example is
a tropical storm triggering a flood. In this case the flood may
trigger further hazards (e.g. ground collapse, ground heave),
but there is no feedback from the flood back to the tropical
storm. In bidirectional relationships, feedback mechanisms
may occur where a primary hazard triggers a secondary haz-
ard which exacerbates the primary hazard, therefore trigger-
ing further episodes of the secondary hazard. An example of
this would be a landslide blocking a river, resulting in a flood,
but then the water upstream of the blockage interacting with
the original landslide, breaking it down, and the water poten-
tially triggering further landslides.
We use the term interaction, therefore, to refer to the
unidirectional and bidirectional effect(s) between one haz-
ard/process and another hazard/process and note examples
of three distinct types of interaction relationships:
i. Triggering relationships (e.g. lightning triggering a
wildfire, groundwater abstraction triggering regional
subsidence, a flood triggering a landslide which then
triggers a further flood).
ii. Increased-probability relationships (e.g. a wildfire in-
creasing the probability of landslides, regional subsi-
dence increasing the probability of flooding).
iii. Catalysis/impedance relationships (e.g. urbanisation
catalysing storm-triggered flooding, storms impeding
urban fire-triggered structural collapse).
While we distinguish triggering relationships and increased
probability relationships as two different types of interac-
tions, we acknowledge that there are similarities between
them as they both represent a change in probability of a sec-
ondary hazard (e.g. landslide), given a primary hazard (e.g.
earthquake). We would suggest that these two interaction
types can be characterised by two end members, with a con-
tinuum between them. A triggering relationship can be char-
acterised as having a probability associated with a thresh-
old being reached or passed. An increased-probability re-
lationship is characterised by a probability associated with
a change in environmental parameters that moves towards
but does not reach a particular threshold. Although there are
similarities, we would suggest that it is beneficial to con-
sider both triggering and increased-probability relationships
as separate interaction types. We propose two ways by which
one can differentiate between a hazard/process triggering
another hazard/process and a hazard/process increasing the
probability of another hazard/process:
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i. Direct vs. indirect sequence of events between the pri-
mary and secondary hazard. In some cases, it is pos-
sible to differentiate between triggering and increased-
probability relationships by considering direct vs. indi-
rect sequences of events between the primary and sec-
ondary hazards/processes. An example of a (roughly)
direct sequence is the addition of water to geological
material on a hillslope, which can directly trigger land-
slides (heavy rain → landslides). In contrast, an ex-
ample (roughly) of an indirect sequence is the influ-
ence of ground subsidence on flooding. Subsidence in
itself may not trigger a flood; however, it could make
flooding more likely to occur in the event of a river
spilling over its banks. Direct sequences tend to be trig-
gering relationships, whereas indirect sequences tend to
be increased-probability relationships.
i. Temporal sequence. It is also possible to differentiate
between some triggering and increased-probability re-
lationships by considering the timing of the sequence of
events and taking both forward-looking and retrospec-
tive views. Take the following time sequence (arbitrary
units and lengths of time):
Time 1
∣∣∣ [Primary Hazard] ∣∣∣ Time 2A ∣∣∣ Time 2B ∣∣∣.
As an illustrative example, we will take an earthquake as
the primary hazard and a triggered landslide population
event as the secondary hazard and will discuss perspec-
tives from before the primary hazard occurs (Time 1)
and two time periods after the primary hazard occurs
(Time 2A and 2B):
(a) While in Time 1, consider what may happen in
Time 2A and 2B (forward looking). Prior to an
earthquake (primary hazard) occurring (Time 1),
and based on past historical knowledge of the re-
gion (e.g. a 50-year historical catalogue of past
earthquakes), it can be stated that there is a given
probability of an earthquake occurring and that,
given an earthquake, landslides (secondary haz-
ard) may occur (i.e. they are triggered by the
earthquake) in the time period of minutes to days
(Time 2A) after the earthquake. Furthermore, while
in Time 1, we can state that more landslides may
occur (i.e. an increased probability) much later af-
ter an earthquake event (months to years) (Time 2B)
due to changes in the parameters governing the sta-
bility of the slope (Havenith, 2014). We cannot
know whether landslides (secondary hazard) will
be directly triggered by the earthquake (primary
hazard) until after the earthquake has occurred (i.e.
until the end of Time 2A), but we can postulate that
the earthquake might trigger landslides.
(b) While at the end of Time 2A, consider what has
occurred in Time 2A (retrospective) and what may
happen in Time 2B (forward looking). Looking ret-
rospectively at Time 2A, the period just after the
earthquake (primary hazard) has occurred, we have
identified any landslides (secondary hazard) that
were triggered by the earthquake. We can also look
forward to Time 2B and state that there is now an
increased probability of landslides due to changes
in the parameters governing the stability of slopes
in the region.
(c) While at the end of Time 2B, consider what has oc-
curred in Time 2A and 2B (retrospective). At this
position in time, we can retrospectively assess what
landslides have been triggered by the earthquake,
either directly triggered in the minutes to days af-
ter the earthquake event (Time 2A) or resulting from
earthquake-induced changes to the landscape which
lead to broader changes to landslide susceptibility
over longer time periods (Time 2B).
When generalising across these three time periods (1, 2A,
2B), recognising that an earthquake (primary hazard) can
both trigger and increase the likelihood of landslides (sec-
ondary hazard) occurring in (Time 2A and 2B) can be a useful
concept, particularly for decision making at an operational
level.
In summary, while causal triggering relationships can only
be “known” retrospectively, there is still a good justifica-
tion for distinguishing between triggering and increased-
probability relationships when using forward-looking ap-
proaches. For any given period of time after a primary haz-
ard, those interested in hazard interactions (e.g. scientists,
hazard managers) may want to know what the likelihood is
of landslides occurring (being triggered), as well as whether
there is a change in the likelihood of landslides beyond this
period of time (increased probability). Although attribution
or identifying a causal relationship between a specific pri-
mary hazard (e.g. a given earthquake) and a specific sec-
ondary hazard (e.g. a given tsunami) is clear in some cases,
other times attribution is not so clear (e.g. the increase in
probability of landslides as a result of a wildfire). This chal-
lenge of attribution is currently in the forefront of the climate
change community, where attempts are made to determine
the existence of causal relationships between anthropogenic
climate change and specific extreme events (Stott et al., 2013;
Shepherd, 2016).
We now discuss each of these three interaction relation-
ships in more detail, giving examples and introducing two vi-
sualisations. These interaction relationships are also used in
Sect. 5 when discussing networks of interactions (cascades).
4.2 Triggering relationships
Triggering relationships are one form of causal relation-
ship, where the occurrence of a primary event can result in
secondary events occurring. For example, a tropical storm
www.earth-syst-dynam.net/7/659/2016/ Earth Syst. Dynam., 7, 659–679, 2016
666 J. C. Gill and B. D. Malamud: Hazard interactions and interaction networks
or hurricane (a primary natural hazard) may trigger many
landslides (a secondary natural hazard) due to the rapid in-
crease in ground saturation, such as in the case of Hurricane
Mitch in 1998, where heavy rain associated with the hurri-
cane resulted in thousands of landslides being triggered in
Guatemala (Bucknam et al., 2001). As noted in Sect. 4.1,
feedback mechanisms can also exist where a triggered sec-
ondary hazard exacerbates the primary hazard and results in
further occurrences of the primary and/or secondary hazard
being triggered.
Triggering interactions can occur between a diverse range
of hazards and processes. Gill and Malamud (2014) consid-
ered just natural hazards and identified 78 possible triggering
pairings between 21 natural hazards (the same natural haz-
ards as those given in Table 1). The inclusion of both an-
thropogenic processes and technological hazards/disasters
would result in many more triggering relationships than the
78 identified by Gill and Malamud (2014) for natural haz-
ards, as there would not only be triggering relationships
within each of the two additional groups (anthropogenic pro-
cesses, technological hazards/disasters) but also a significant
number arising between all three groups.
We also highlight that each triggering relationship iden-
tified will have different likelihoods associated with it. In
any given location, the likelihood will be dependent on site-
specific conditions (e.g. geology, hydrology, neotectonics,
the extent of human activity). From a probabilistic viewpoint,
generalising across multiple individual events for each trig-
gering relationship, we can also infer that some triggering
relationships are more likely to occur than others. For ex-
ample, Gill and Malamud (2014) use a nine-point scale to
classify the spatial overlap and temporal likelihood of each
of the 78 primary-secondary natural hazard triggering rela-
tionships that they identified. An example of a triggering re-
lationship with low spatial overlap and low temporal likeli-
hood is a landslide triggering a volcanic eruption. An exam-
ple of a triggering relationship with high spatial overlap and
high temporal likelihood is a storm triggering a landslide.
Of importance in the context of characterising triggering
relationships are the spatial and temporal scales of interest.
When considering interactions in a specific local/regional
setting, different interaction behaviours will occur at dif-
ferent spatial and temporal scales. For example, an anthro-
pogenic process, such as agricultural practice change, could
occur at multiple scales. An individual farmer ploughing a
new field (approximate spatial scale of 0.1–1 km2, tempo-
ral scale of days to weeks) is likely to have a different in-
fluence compared to a societal transition from manual to
machine-dominated farming (approximate spatial scale of
104–107 km2, temporal scale of years to centuries). Differ-
ences in the scale of interest of agricultural practice change
would result in diverse characterisations of the possible trig-
gering relationships. In the context of this paper we are
not focusing on a specific local/regional study or at a spe-
cific spatial/temporal scale but rather considering a global
overview of interactions, generalising across many spatial
and temporal scales.
Another important factor for consideration when charac-
terising triggering relationships is the relative timing of dif-
ferent stages. For example, some anthropogenic processes
may involve multiple stages, including an initial decision-
making or survey stage before ground disturbance. In this
example, it is possible that a given anthropogenic process
may trigger other processes to occur before, simultaneously
with, or after any ground disturbance has occurred. Where
an associated process is stated to occur before a primary an-
thropogenic process, it is normally occurring after at least
one preliminary stage of the primary anthropogenic process.
Associated processes can therefore be considered to be trig-
gered by an occurrence of a primary anthropogenic process.
For example, subsurface construction, such as tunnelling,
may require drainage and dewatering to take place before the
tunnelling commences. The need for drainage or dewatering
would be determined during preliminary ground reconnais-
sance and site investigation.
When considering combinations between the three groups
of hazards/processes (natural hazards, anthropogenic pro-
cesses, technological hazards/disasters), we identify nine
possible triggering relationships between these groups and
visualise these in Fig. 2, a hazard/process flow diagram.
Triggering relationships are illustrated using block arrows,
with the internal arrow fill colour indicating the group of
hazards or processes to which the trigger source belongs.
Medium grey is used for natural hazards (labelled A), dark
grey is used for anthropogenic processes (labelled B), and
light grey is used for technological hazards/disasters (la-
belled C). We use a prime (A′, B′, C′) to indicate secondary
hazards/processes triggered by the same primary hazard or
process (A, B, C). Examples of all nine possible interactions
are given in a table below Fig. 2, with codes (i.e. A1–A3, B1–
B3, C1–C3) relating to arrow labels derived from the hazard
or process type of the trigger source (i.e. A, B, C) and fol-
lowed by sequential subscript numbering. Numbering in our
hazard/process flow diagram starts (A1, B1, C1) with the trig-
gering relationship between the same primary and secondary
hazard or process type (e.g. a primary natural hazard trigger-
ing a secondary natural hazard) and progresses clockwise.
These nine possible triggering relationships demonstrate an
important set of interaction relationships that could be in-
cluded within a multi-hazard methodology.
4.3 Increased-probability relationships
Another type of causal relationship can be observed when a
primary natural hazard, anthropogenic process or technolog-
ical hazard increases the probability of another such event
occurring. These situations involve a primary hazard or pro-
cess altering one or more environmental parameters so as
to change the temporal proximity or specific characteristics
of an individual or population of secondary hazards or pro-
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C′. Secondary technological 
hazards/disasters*
C. Primary  technological 
hazards/disasters
Internal arrow fill
Interaction relationships initiated by  natural hazards.
Interaction relationships initiated by  anthropogenic processes.
Interaction relationships initiated by  technological hazards/disasters.
B′. Secondary 
anthropogenic processes*
A′. Secondary
natural hazards*
A. Primary
natural hazards
B. Primary
anthropogenic processes
B3
B1
B2
A1
A2A3 C2
C3
C1
1 2 3
A
Earthquake triggers 
landslides
Drought triggers 
agricultural practice 
change
Earthquake triggers 
nuclear reactor
meltdown
B
Subsurface mining drives 
dewatering
Subsurface mining 
triggers mine collapse 
Fluid injection triggers 
earthquakes
C
Transport accident 
triggers chemical spill
Dam collapse triggers 
flooding
Structural collapse drives 
infilled (made) ground 
Examples for interaction relationships A 1–C 3
*Secondary hazards may initiate further interactions.
Figure 2. Interaction relationships (triggering) framework using a
hazard/process flow diagram. A framework for hazard/process in-
teractions is given here, which highlights triggering relationships
between three groups: (A) natural hazards, (B) anthropogenic pro-
cesses and (C) technological hazards/disasters. Arrows are used to
illustrate interaction relationships, with the arrow fill colour indi-
cating the source or initiation of the trigger (medium grey: natu-
ral hazards; dark grey: anthropogenic processes; light grey: tech-
nological hazards/disasters). We use a prime (A′, B′, C′) to indi-
cate secondary hazards/processes triggered by the same primary
hazard/process group (A, B, C). Arrows are labelled (A1–A3, B1–
B3, C1–C3) according to the hazard or process type of the trigger
source (i.e. A, B, C) and followed by sequential subscript number-
ing. Numbering starts (A1, B1, C1) with the triggering relationship
between the same primary and secondary hazard or process type
(e.g. a primary natural hazard triggering a secondary natural hazard)
and progresses clockwise. Examples of each interaction are given in
the table at the bottom of the figure, where the vertical axis indicates
the source of the primary hazard/process (A, B, C) and the horizon-
tal axis indicates which subscript is being referred to (1, 2, 3).
cesses (Kappes et al., 2010; Gill and Malamud, 2014). Ex-
amples relating to specific natural hazards include an earth-
quake increasing the susceptibility of a slope to landslides,
regional subsidence increasing the probability of flooding,
or wildfires increasing the probability of ground heave. In
Gill and Malamud (2014), we took the 21 different natural
hazards identified in Table 1 and identified 75 possible rela-
tionships where a primary natural hazard could increase the
probability of a secondary natural hazard. The inclusion of
anthropogenic processes and technological hazards/disasters
will also result in many more increased-probability relation-
ships.
4.4 Catalysing and impedance relationships
We have discussed above that one hazard/process may trigger
another hazard/process. It is possible that further hazards and
processes may cause these triggering relationship pairings to
be catalysed or impeded. For example, tropical storms can
often trigger floods. This triggering relationship can be catal-
ysed by other specific anthropogenic processes (e.g. vegeta-
tion removal, urbanisation), natural hazards (e.g. wildfires)
or technological failures (e.g. blocked drainage). Conversely,
a volcanic eruption can trigger wildfires, but this triggering
relationship may be impeded by other specific anthropogenic
processes (e.g. deforestation) or natural hazards (e.g. tropical
storms).
In addition to the 9 triggering interaction relationships pre-
viously identified (Fig. 2), a further 12 possible catalysing
and impedance relationships can be considered, which we
visualise in Fig. 3, also a hazard/process flow diagram. In
Fig. 3, we contrast triggering relationships (9 thick block ar-
rows with solid outlines) and catalysing/impedance relation-
ships (12 thin block arrows with dashed outlines). The in-
ternal arrow fill colour again indicates the group of hazards
or processes to which the catalyst/impeder belongs (medium
grey: natural hazards; dark grey: anthropogenic processes;
light grey: technological hazards/disasters).
Figure 3 highlights the range of possible interaction
relationships between the three broad groups of haz-
ards/processes, using a hazard/process flow diagram. Within
each type of interaction relationship there exist specific inter-
actions that are rare and others that are very common, with
a wide spectrum between these two end members. Location-
specific conditions influence the likelihood of any given in-
teraction relationship. The likelihood of each catalysing re-
lationship will depend on (i) the likelihood of the primary
hazard/process occurring, (ii) the likelihood of the primary
hazard/process triggering a secondary hazard, and (iii) the
likelihood of a given hazard/process catalysing this interac-
tion pairing. Consider, for example, the unloading of slopes
through road construction catalysing earthquake or storm-
triggered landslides (thin, dark-grey arrow from B to A1 in
Fig. 3). In Sect. 3.2 we introduced this example, describ-
ing how Owen et al. (2008) had found that road construc-
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Key: 
Internal arrow  fill
Relationships initiated by  natural hazards 
(e.g., A1–A3).
Relationships initiated by  anthropogenic 
processes (e.g., B1–B3).
Relationships initiated by  technological 
hazards/disasters (e.g., C1–C3).
C′. Secondary ƚechnological 
hazards/disasters*
C. Primary technological 
hazards/disasters
B′. Secondary 
anthropogenic processes*
A′. Secondary
natural hazards*
B. Primary
anthropogenic processes
B1
B2
A1
A2A3
C1
A. Primary
natural hazards
C3
C2 B3
External arrow line
Triggering/driving relationship
Catalysing and impeding relationships
*Secondary hazards may initiate 
further interactions.
Figure 3. Interaction relationships (triggering, catalysing and impeding) framework using a hazard/process flow diagram. Interactions in
the form of triggering relationships (Fig. 2) and catalysing/impedance interactions are possible between (A) natural hazards, (B) anthro-
pogenic processes and (C) technological hazards/disasters. We use a prime (A′, B′, C′) to indicate secondary hazards/processes triggered
by the same primary hazard/process group (A, B, C). We contrast here triggering relationships (thick block arrows with solid outlines) and
catalysing/impedance relationships (thin block arrows with dashed outlines). The internal arrow fill colour indicates the group of hazards
or processes to which the catalyst/impeder belongs (medium grey: natural hazard; dark grey: anthropogenic process; light grey: technolog-
ical hazard/disaster). Descriptions of arrow labels (A1–A3, B1–B3, C1–C3) can be found in the Fig. 2 caption. Examples of catalysing and
impedance relationships are given in Sect. 4.4.
tion catalysed the triggering of landslides during the 8 Oc-
tober 2005 Kashmir earthquake. In regions that are suscep-
tible to landslides, the influence of road construction is well
documented (e.g. Montgomery, 1994; Devkota et al., 2013;
Brenning et al., 2015). It is a catalysing relationship that is
common in many parts of the world. Overall, the differen-
tial likelihood of any relationship will depend on the range
of location-specific parameters. Only through the careful as-
sessment of all possible single hazards and processes can rel-
evant interactions be identified and assessed.
Examples of some specific catalysing and impeding inter-
action relationships are presented below. Here we state which
hazard or process group (e.g. anthropogenic process) is act-
ing as the catalysing or impeding agent, whether it is a cataly-
sis or impedance relationship, and which triggering relation-
ship identified in Sect. 4.2 is being catalysed or impeded (e.g.
A1, B1, C1 as labelled and described in Sect. 4.2). We then
give a more specific example.
i. Anthropogenic processes catalysing triggering rela-
tionship A1 (thin, dark-grey arrow from B to A1 in
Fig. 3): for example, urbanisation catalyses storm-
triggered flooding.
ii. Technological hazards/disasters catalysing triggering
relationship A1 (thin, light-grey arrow from C to A1 in
Fig. 3): for example, dam collapse catalyses flood trig-
gered landslides.
iii. Natural hazards catalysing triggering relationship B1
(thin, medium-grey arrow from A to B1 in Fig. 3): for
example, flood catalyses urbanisation triggered agricul-
tural practice change.
iv. Natural hazards impeding triggering relationship C1
(thin medium grey arrow from A to C1 in Fig. 3): for ex-
ample, storm impedes structural-collapse-triggered ur-
ban fires.
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5 Networks of hazard interactions (cascades)
In Sect. 4, we discussed three different interac-
tion relationships (triggering, increased probability,
catalysing/impedance) between specific natural hazards, an-
thropogenic processes and technological hazards/disasters.
However, in addition to having a paired relationship (e.g.
one primary natural hazard triggering a secondary natural
hazard) these interactions can be joined together to form a
network of hazard and/or process interactions. For simpli-
fication of language, we will call these networks of hazard
interactions or interaction hazard networks. Such networks
have also been referred to as hazard chains (e.g. Han et
al., 2007; Xu et al., 2014), cascades (e.g. Choine et al., 2015;
Pescaroli and Alexander, 2015) or multi-hazard networks of
interacting hazards (Gill and Malamud, 2014). Networks of
hazard interactions may consist of short or long chains of
interactions, and may include single or multiple branches.
In Sect. 5.1 we introduce four case study examples of net-
works of hazard interactions: one example from Nepal and
three from Guatemala. In Sect. 5.2 we illustrate the wide
variation in spatial and temporal extent, frequency and im-
pacts of such networks of hazard interactions, using three of
these case studies. In Sect. 5.3 we then use our hazard inter-
action matrix and hazard/process flow diagrams to visualise
networks of hazard interactions, using two of these case stud-
ies and three theoretical examples. Finally, in Sect. 5.4, we
discuss why we believe evaluating networks of hazard inter-
actions is important.
5.1 Case study examples (Nepal and Guatemala)
Networks of hazard interactions are relevant in many loca-
tions around the world. Guatemala is an example of a loca-
tion where multiple different networks of hazard interactions
can be identified. We have identified examples of the wide
range of hazards and processes in Guatemala using 21 semi-
structured interviews with Guatemalan hazard professionals
and personal field observations, during 2 months of fieldwork
in 2014.
– Specific natural hazards: earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions, landslides, floods, droughts, tropical storms, ex-
treme temperatures, subsidence, ground collapse and
wildfires.
– Relevant anthropogenic processes: deforestation, inade-
quate drainage, agricultural practices and building/road
construction practices.
– Technological hazards/disasters of relevance: structural
collapses, urban fires, chemical pollution and transport
accidents.
Specific hazards or processes influencing Guatemala may
last for decades (e.g. eruptive activity of Santiaguito; Bluth
and Rose, 2004) or days (e.g. Tropical Storm Agatha; Stew-
art, 2011), impacting large areas (e.g. landslides across thou-
sands of square kilometres; Harp et al., 1981) or small areas
(e.g. 20 m ground collapses; Stewart, 2011). A wide range
of possible interactions exist in Guatemala between specific
natural hazards, anthropogenic processes and technological
hazards/disasters. Here we present four case study examples
of networks of hazard interactions, with three examples from
Guatemala and one additional example from Nepal, ordered
according to their use in subsequent sections.
i. Case Study 1: Mw = 7.8 Nepal earthquake, April 2015
(earthquake, landslides, floods). The 25 April 2015
Mw = 7.8 Gorkha earthquake in Nepal impacted several
Himalayan nations, triggering aMw = 7.3 aftershock on
12 May 2015 (Bilham, 2015; Collins and Jibson, 2015).
The initial earthquake is reported to have triggered
553 aftershocks with Mw > 4 in the 45 days after the
25 April 2015 Mw = 7.8 Gorkha earthquake (Adhikari
et al., 2015). The main shock and aftershocks rapidly
triggered snow avalanches and thousands of landslides,
with some of the landslides blocking rivers, which in
some cases triggered upstream flooding (Collins and
Jibson, 2015). The earthquake sequence also increased
the probability of further landslides, triggered by subse-
quent monsoon rains (Bilham, 2015; Collins and Jibson,
2015).
ii. Case Study 2: Santiaguito lahars and triggered flood-
ing, Guatemala, approximately annual (volcanic activ-
ity, rain, lahars, floods). In Guatemala, rainfall mobil-
isation of ash and tephra deposits on active volcanic
flanks, such as Santiaguito, frequently result in lahars.
These lahars subsequently trigger floods through in-
creased sedimentation, the addition of large amounts
of tephra material to the hydrological system (Harris
et al., 2006). This network of hazard interactions (cas-
cades) can be observed on an approximately annual ba-
sis, during the rainy season, while Santiaguito is active.
iii. Case Study 3: Tropical Storm Agatha and eruption of
Pacaya volcano, Guatemala, May 2010 (volcanic activ-
ity, tropical storm, landslides, floods, ground collapse,
structural collapse). Tropical Storm Agatha impacted
several nations within Central America, hitting the Pa-
cific coastline of Guatemala on 29 May 2010 (Stew-
art, 2011). It was associated with strong winds and tor-
rential rains (Stewart, 2011; Stewart and Cangialosi,
2012). Within Guatemala, the storm-triggered land-
slides (Wardman et al., 2012) and flooding across much
of the southern Guatemala Highlands, and contributed
to a rare, localised (20 m diameter), rapid-onset ground
collapse event (Stewart, 2011) in Guatemala City.
The effects of Tropical Storm Agatha in Guatemala
were exacerbated by the near-simultaneous eruption of
Pacaya, a complex volcano located 30 km southwest of
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Guatemala City. Pacaya erupted 2 days prior to the on-
set of Tropical Storm Agatha on 27 May 2010 (Ward-
man et al., 2012), ejecting ash and debris across much of
Guatemala City. As ash blocked the inadequate drainage
system, it increased the intensity of flooding during
Tropical Storm Agatha (United Nations, 2010). The
combination of fresh ash, volcanic debris and heavy rain
generated lahars (a natural hazard) and structural col-
lapse (a technological hazard/disaster) (Daniell, 2011;
Wardman et al., 2012).
iv. Case Study 4: Mw = 7.5 Guatemala earthquake, 1976
(earthquake, ground collapse, landslides, floods). This
Mw = 7.5 earthquake triggered multiple aftershocks,
and movement on other faults close to Guatemala City
(Espinosa, 1976; Plafker et al., 1976). The earthquake
triggered some rapid subsidence or ground collapse
(Plafker et al., 1976) and more than 10 000 landslides,
rock falls and debris flows (Harp et al., 1981). Many
of these mass movements occurred along poorly built
road and rail cuttings, blocking vital transport routes
(Plafker et al., 1976). Some of the mass movements also
blocked rivers and triggered upstream flooding (Plafker
et al., 1976; Harp et al., 1981). Breaches of these land-
slide dams also resulted in further flooding (Harp et
al., 1981).
Many other examples of networks of hazard interactions
(cascades) can be observed in the published scientific liter-
ature, technical reports, press releases and other forums. It is
beyond the scope of this article to compile a comprehensive
list of these cascades; however, many can be found in the
references noted at the end of this article. We proceed to use
the four case study examples outlined above, together with
three further theoretical examples, to illustrate two important
concepts relating to networks of hazard interactions.
5.2 Variations in spatial and temporal extent, frequency
and impact of networks of hazard interactions
(cascades)
In the example case studies described in Sect. 5.1, we ob-
serve variation in the spatial and temporal extent, frequency
and impact of networks of hazard interactions. Networks
of hazard interactions (cascades) can vary over many or-
ders of magnitude both spatially and temporally. For ex-
ample, a tropical storm (lasting several days) may trigger
landslides across a small localised area or an entire region
(e.g. Central America). One of these triggered landslides
may further block a river causing a small, localised flood or
weaken the structural integrity of a dam and cause a large
regional flood. We illustrate the wide variation in spatial
and temporal extent, frequency of networks of hazard inter-
actions and impacts of such networks using Case Study 1
(Mw = 7.8 Nepal earthquake and triggered hazards, April
2015), Case Study 2 (Santiaguito lahars and triggered flood-
ing, Guatemala, approximately annual), and Case Study 3
(Tropical Storm Agatha and eruption of Pacaya volcano,
Guatemala, May 2010).
In the 2015 Mw = 7.8 Gorkha earthquake, Nepal (Case
Study 1 in Sect. 5.1), thousands of landslides were triggered
across a wide spatial extent (30 000 km2), with at least 69 of
these landslides forming landslide dams (Collins and Jibson,
2015). Many of these dams impounded water, causing flood-
ing, with surface areas ranging from 50 to 35 000 m2 (Collins
and Jibson, 2015). Landslides were both triggered in the min-
utes and days after the earthquake, but the susceptibility of
slopes was also changed so as to make landslides more likely
in the months to years after the earthquake (Bilham, 2015;
Collins and Jibson, 2015)
The regular eruptions of Santiaguito in Guatemala and
subsequent lahars/flooding (Case Study 2 in Sect. 5.1) also
illustrate variation across spatial and temporal scales. Vol-
canic activity may extend over a sub-national, national or
multi-national spatial level, and be either short-lived or per-
sist for many decades. The Santiaguito dome in Guatemala,
for example, has seen unsteady, extrusive activity since 1922
(Bluth and Rose, 2004), mainly impacting the southwest
of Guatemala. Volcanic activity at Santiaguito, in combina-
tion with regular rainfall, results in lahars each rainy sea-
son, which have an impact on the fluvial system at distances
of up to 60 km from Santiaguito, including causing flood-
ing (Harris et al., 2006). While in Guatemala in 2014, we
confirmed this network of hazard interactions using personal
field observations and discussions in seven semi-structured
interviews with hazard monitoring and civil protection offi-
cials.
Finally, consider the example of Tropical Storm Agatha
and the eruption of Pacaya volcano (May 2010) in Guatemala
(Case Study 3 in Sect. 5.1), which also demonstrates varia-
tions in spatial and temporal scale. Tropical Storm Agatha
had an impact across multiple nations within Central Amer-
ica (a scale of hundreds of thousands of square kilometres).
In contrast, one of the secondary hazards associated with this
storm was a localised ground collapse event, with a diameter
of 20 m (Stewart, 2011).
Networks of hazard interactions (cascades) can also vary
in terms of their frequency and impact. For example, they can
be observed in low-frequency, high-impact events such as
the 2015 Mw = 7.8 Gorkha earthquake, Nepal (Case Study 1
in Sect. 5.1). These internationally publicised events help to
raise the profile of networks of hazard interactions (cascades)
to an international audience. The 2015 Mw = 7.8 Gorkha
earthquake, Nepal, and resulting secondary hazards resulted
in more than 8700 fatalities and 3.5 million people displaced
(Bilham, 2015). Networks of hazard interactions (cascades)
are also observed in localised, high-frequency events, such as
the regular eruptions of Santiaguito in Guatemala and subse-
quent lahars/flooding (Case Study 2 in Sect. 5.1). This an-
nual network of interacting hazards (cascades), although not
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commonly associated with high numbers of fatalities, does
have the potential to impact livelihoods of those living in this
vicinity and the wider economy (Harris et al., 2006). Dur-
ing Tropical Storm Agatha (May 2010) in Guatemala (Case
Study 3 in Sect. 5.1), a diversity of impacts included at least
nine triggered landslides that caused fatalities (Kirschbaum
et al., 2012), as well as the economic costs associated with
flooding in Guatemala City and structural collapse caused by
the combination of ash and heavy rain (United Nations, 2010;
Daniell, 2011; Wardman et al., 2012).
As demonstrated through discussion of these case studies,
networks of hazard interactions (cascades) are relevant at di-
verse spatial and temporal scales, can be both high- and low-
frequency events, and have impacts ranging from fatalities to
impacts on livelihoods.
5.3 Visualising networks of hazard interactions
(cascades)
Given the prevalence of networks of hazard interactions, we
consider here how these networks can be visualised to sup-
port multi-hazard assessments of interacting natural hazards.
In this section we present two ways of visualising networks
of hazard interactions, using Case Study 2 (Santiaguito la-
hars and triggered flooding, Guatemala, approximately an-
nual), Case Study 4 (1976Mw = 7.5 Guatemala earthquake)
and other hypothetical examples.
In Gill and Malamud (2014), we developed one method
of visualising networks of hazard interactions through the
use of a 21× 21 hazard interaction matrix, showing possi-
ble interactions between 21 different primary and secondary
natural hazards, and then overlaid onto this relevant infor-
mation about the network of hazard interactions. In Fig. 4
we show this methodology using a hypothetical, but com-
mon, example of a network of hazard interactions (cascade)
formed exclusively from natural hazards. This network of
hazard interactions is presented on a 21× 21 hazard interac-
tion matrix, which includes both triggered relationships and
relationships where one hazard increases the probability of
another. It uses a two-letter code for the 21 different natural
hazards, the same hazards as those given in Table 1. The ver-
tical axis of the matrix in Fig. 4 displays the primary hazards
(rows 1 to 21, EQ to IM). These are the initial hazards that
trigger or increase the probability of another hazard occur-
ring. The horizontal axis of the matrix presents these same
hazards as potential secondary hazards (columns A to U, EQ
to IM). These are the triggered hazards, or the hazards for
which the probability of occurrence has been increased. The
21 hazard types are clustered into six hazard groups, iden-
tifiable with different colours as indicated in the key. Each
matrix cell is divided diagonally so that there are two trian-
gles in a cell. Shading in the upper triangle of a given cell
indicates that the primary hazard could trigger an occurrence
of the secondary hazard. Shading in the lower triangle of a
given cell indicates that the primary hazard could increase
the probability of the secondary hazard. It is, of course, pos-
sible for both of these triangles to be shaded for any given
primary–secondary hazard coupling. The network of hazard
interactions (cascade) presented within Fig. 4, overlying the
21×21 hazard interaction matrix, is a hypothetical example,
initiated by a storm (row 12, ST) that triggers flooding (col-
umn F, FL). This flooding may (row 6, FL) subsequently trig-
ger landslides (column D, LA) through the erosion of slope
bases. These landslides (row 4, LA) could then trigger or
increase the probability of further flooding (column F, FL)
through the damming of rivers.
Using the hazard interaction matrix visualisation frame-
work illustrated in Fig. 4, we can also represent two of the
case study examples introduced in Sect. 5.1. Figure 5 shows
two examples of networks of hazard interactions (cascades),
both from the southern Guatemala Highlands. Figure 5 (top)
visualises some of the hazards and hazard interactions rel-
evant to the 1976 Mw = 7.5 Guatemala earthquake (Case
Study 4 in Sect. 5.1). An earthquake (row 1, EQ) triggered
other earthquakes (column A, EQ), landslides (column D,
LA), and ground collapse (column I, GC). The landslides
(row 4, LA) subsequently blocked rivers and caused flooding
(column F, FL). Figure 5 (bottom) visualises some of the haz-
ards and hazard interactions associated with lahar-triggered
flooding around the volcano Santiaguito (Case Study 2 in
Sect. 5.1). Heavy rainfall (row 12, ST) mobilises volcanic
material to trigger lahars (column D, LA). These lahars (a
form of mass movement) (row 4, LA) result in significant
volcanic material entering rivers and causing flooding (col-
umn F, FL).
The hazard/process flow diagram visualisations previously
introduced in Sect. 4 (Figs. 2, 3) can also be used to represent
complex networks of hazard interactions involving a mix-
ture of natural hazards, anthropogenic processes and tech-
nological hazards/disasters. We use the structure of Figs. 2
and 3, with appropriate replication within the same figure to
allow for longer and more complex networks of hazard in-
teractions, and give two theoretical examples (A and B, de-
scribed further below) in Figs. 6 and 7 of a complex network
of hazard interactions. The two hazard/process flow diagram
examples in Figs. 6 and 7 show all possible triggering inter-
actions (thick block arrows with solid outlines) and (for sim-
plification) only relevant catalysing/impedance interactions
(thin block arrows with dashed outlines). Possible networks
of hazard interactions are visualised using light-blue boxes
to highlight the relevant hazards/processes (i.e. nodes within
a network), and dark-blue arrows to highlight the relevant in-
teractions (i.e. links within a network).
Theoretical network of hazard interactions, example A
(four links, arrows labelled 1 to 4), using a hazard/process
flow diagram. Figure 6 shows a primary anthropogenic pro-
cess catalysing (thin arrow 1) the triggering relationship be-
tween a primary and secondary natural hazard (thick ar-
row 2), with the secondary natural hazard then triggering
(thick arrow 3) a primary technological hazard, which in
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SYMBOL EXPLANATION
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Secondary Hazard
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Footnotes
[1A,D,E; 3A,P; 12D-F,M,P; 13P; 14D-F,P; 15D-F; 17A,D-F; 21A] The secondary hazards in these cases are all accepted to most likely occur as large 
numbers of events, and are thus analysed in this way.
[1C] There is disagreement in the literature about the nature of this relationship.
[2,6,12,14,15C] Water input triggers or increases the probability of a phreatic/phreatomagmatic eruption.
[3I] Volcanism increases the acidity of rain, promoting dissolution of carbonate material.
[12A] Low-pressure systems have been shown to trigger or increase the probability of slow earthquakes on faults that are already close to failure 
(Liu et al., 2009).
[17A,C-F] Secondary hazards triggered or have an increased probability over a range of timescales, through snow and glacial melting.
[18C] Long-term reductions in temperature can increase glaciation and thus decrease sea levels. This reduction in sea levels can reduce confining 
pressures, promoting volcanic eruptions.
Figure 4. An example of a network of hazard interactions (a cascade system) (from Gill and Malamud, 2014) using a hazard interaction
matrix. A 21× 21 matrix with primary natural hazards on the vertical axis and secondary hazards on the horizontal axis. These hazards are
coded, as explained in the key. This matrix shows cases where a primary hazard could trigger a secondary hazard (upper triangle shaded)
and cases where a primary hazard could increase the probability of a secondary hazard being triggered (bottom triangle shaded). Where
both triangles are shaded, this indicates that the primary hazard could both trigger and increase the probability of a secondary hazard. Also
distinguished are those relationships where a primary hazard has the potential to trigger or increase the probability of multiple occurrences of
the secondary hazard (dark grey) and few or single occurrences of the secondary hazard (light grey). Hazards are grouped into geophysical
(green), hydrological (blue), shallow Earth processes (orange), atmospheric (red), biophysical (purple) and space/celestial (grey). Footnotes
give further information about some of the relationships. This matrix can be used to present an example of a network of hazard interactions
(cascade). In this network of hazard interactions example (illustrated using rectangles, circles and arrows overlaid on the matrix), a storm
event (ST) triggers flooding (FL), which then triggers landslides (LA). These landslides (LA) may then trigger or increase the probability of
further flooding (FL) through the blocking of a river or the increase in sediment within the fluvial system.
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Figure 5. Two examples of networks of hazard interactions (cascade systems) using a hazard interaction matrix. Hazard interaction networks
based on (top) the 1976 Guatemala earthquake sequence and (bottom) lahar-triggered flooding associated with Santiaguito, Guatemala. Both
network examples are placed on a 21× 21 hazard interaction matrix, adapted from Gill and Malamud (2014), and described in detail within
the caption of Fig. 4. In the top example (described in Sect. 5.2), based on information from Espinosa (1976), Plafker et al. (1976) and Harp
et al. (1981), we use rectangles, circles and arrows to illustrate the network of hazard interactions for an earthquake (EQ) triggering further
earthquakes (EQ), landslides (LA) and rapid subsidence/ground collapse (GC). The landslides (LA) were then noted to have blocked rivers,
causing flooding (FL). The bottom network of hazard interactions example (also described in Sect. 5.2) is based on information from Harris
et al. (2006) and confirmed by personal field observations and seven semi-structured interviews with hazard monitoring and civil protection
officials while the authors were in Guatemala in 2014. The bottom example shows (again using rectangles, circles and arrows) rain storms
(ST) triggering lahars (LA) on the flanks of Santiaguito. These lahars enter the hydrological system and result in flooding (FL) downstream.
www.earth-syst-dynam.net/7/659/2016/ Earth Syst. Dynam., 7, 659–679, 2016
674 J. C. Gill and B. D. Malamud: Hazard interactions and interaction networks
C′. Secondary technological 
hazards/disasters*
C. Primary technological 
hazards/disasters
B′. Secondary 
anthropogenic processes*
B. Primary
anthropogenic processes
A. Primary
natural hazards
2
1
C′. Secondary technological 
hazards/disasters*
C. Primary technological 
hazards/disasters
B′. Secondary 
anthropogenic processes*
B. Primary
anthropogenic processes4
A′. Secondary
natural hazards
3
A′′. Tertiary
natural hazards*
Key: 
Internal arrow fill
Interaction relationship
Interaction relationship (forming part of example cascade) 
External arrow line (interaction type)
Triggering relationship
Catalysing/impeding relationship
*Secondary and tertiary hazards may initiate further interactions.
Figure 6. Network of hazard interactions (example A) using a hazard/process flow diagram. Using the visualisation frameworks constructed
in Figs. 2 and 3, an example of an interaction network (cascade) can be presented. Three hazard/process groups are included: (A) natural
hazards, (B) anthropogenic processes and (C) technological hazards/disasters. Arrows are used to illustrate interaction relationships, with
both triggering relationships (thick block arrows with solid outlines) and relevant catalysing/impedance relationships (thin block arrows
with dashed outlines). For clarity of communication, those catalysing/impedance relationships not of relevance to the specific example are
not included. See caption explanations in Figs. 2 and 3 for further details. Arrows within the example network of hazard interactions are
labelled (1–4) and shaded dark blue to highlight the relevant pathway. In this example, a primary anthropogenic process catalyses (1) the
triggering relationship between a primary and secondary natural hazard (2), with the secondary natural hazard then triggering (3) a primary
technological hazard, which in turns triggers (4) a primary anthropogenic process to occur.
turns triggers (thick arrow 4) a primary anthropogenic pro-
cess to occur. An analogous example of this interaction net-
work would be urbanisation increasing overland flow and
therefore catalysing (1) storm-triggered floods (2), with the
floods then triggering (3) an embankment to collapse, which
in turn triggers (4) anthropogenic drainage and dewatering.
Theoretical network of hazard interactions, example B
(five links, arrows labelled 1 to 5), using a hazard/process
flow diagram. The network of hazard interactions in Fig. 7
is more complex, with three branches and five interaction re-
lationships highlighted. This example shows a primary nat-
ural hazard triggering (thick arrow 1) a primary technolog-
ical hazard, which in turn triggers (thick arrow 2) a pri-
mary anthropogenic process. The same primary natural haz-
ard may trigger (thick arrow 3) a secondary natural hazard.
This secondary natural hazard could then trigger (thick ar-
row 4) a primary technological hazard and (thick arrow 5)
tertiary natural hazards. An analogous example of this in-
teraction network would be an earthquake triggering (1) a
structural collapse, which in turn results in (2) increases in
infilled (made) ground. The earthquake may also trigger (3)
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Figure 7. Network of hazard interactions (example B) using a hazard/process flow diagram. Using the visualisations constructed in Figs. 2
and 3, an example of an interaction network (cascade) can be presented. In this example the network is more complex than in example A
(Fig. 6), with three branches and five interaction relationships highlighted here. Three hazard/process groups are included: (A) natural haz-
ards, (B) anthropogenic processes and (C) technological hazards/disasters. Arrows are used to illustrate interaction relationships, with both
triggering relationships (thick block arrows with solid outlines) and relevant catalysing/impedance relationships (thin block arrows with
dashed outlines). For clarity of communication, those catalysing/impedance relationships not of relevance to the specific example are not
included. See caption explanations in Figs. 2 and 3 for further details. Arrows within the example network of hazard interactions are labelled
(1–5) and shaded dark blue to highlight the relevant pathway. This example shows a primary natural hazard triggering (1) a primary tech-
nological hazard, which in turn triggers (2) a primary anthropogenic process. The same primary natural hazard may trigger (3) a secondary
natural hazard. This secondary natural hazard could then trigger (4) a primary technological hazard and (5) tertiary natural hazards.
landslides, which could trigger (4) a road traffic accident and
(5) flooding.
The overlay of networks of hazard interactions from case
studies in Sect. 5.1 on hazard interaction matrices (Figs. 4, 5),
and the overlay of theoretical examples on hazard/process
flow diagrams (Figs. 6, 7) can be complemented by other
visualisation techniques. For example, when a quantitative
evaluation of possible outcomes of interaction relationships
is possible, probability trees can be used to assess networks
of hazard interactions (e.g. Neri et al., 2008; Marzocchi et
al., 2009; Neri et al., 2013). Probability trees are used to visu-
ally represent the possible outcomes of an event and add as-
sociated probabilities. All three methods are useful for com-
municating information about specific chains of events. The
two visualisation techniques that we have presented here, to-
gether with existing probability trees, allow simple and more
complex networks of hazard interactions to be evaluated and
visualised.
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5.4 Importance of networks of hazard interactions
(cascades)
We believe that the assessment and visualisation of possible
interaction networks (cascades) within multi-hazard method-
ologies is of importance to both the theoretical and practical
understanding of hazards and disaster risk reduction. Here
we outline three principal reasons for identifying possible in-
teraction networks.
5.4.1 Risk assessments and risk management benefit
by better matching observed reality
An analysis of past occurrences of hazards and disasters
shows that interaction networks are often part of the struc-
ture of disasters. The need to better match observed reality,
by including interaction networks, is applicable to events of
diverse spatial and temporal extent, frequency and impact,
as has been discussed in Sect. 5.2. The frequency of oc-
currence of specific networks of hazard interactions demon-
strates that more could be done to understand and charac-
terise them. Following the 2015 Gorkha (Nepal) earthquake,
the European Geosciences Union (EGU) issued a statement
(EGU, 2015) calling for a multi-hazard, integrated approach
to risk assessment and the management of natural hazards.
This statement also notes the need for agreement within the
geoscience community on how to model cascades of natural
hazards. This call joins many previous calls (Delmonaco et
al., 2007; Kappes et al., 2012; Marzocchi et al., 2012; Gill
and Malamud, 2014; Liu et al., 2016) encouraging the as-
sessment of interacting natural hazards and their integration
into multi-hazard methodologies. Assessing interaction net-
works is therefore important as they are a fundamental part
of hazard and disaster events.
5.4.2 Changes to social and physical vulnerability
during links of a multi-hazard cascade event
As one progresses along a network of hazard interactions
(cascade), aspects of social and/or physical vulnerability may
change following the occurrence of a specific natural haz-
ard, anthropogenic process or technological hazard/disaster.
If there is a succession of hazard events (i.e. a network of haz-
ard interactions), there may be progressive changes in vul-
nerability during this succession. While some aspects of vul-
nerability may remain at the same level before and after the
occurrence of a specific event, it is also possible that other as-
pects of vulnerability may increase as pressure is placed on
society and infrastructure, thus reducing coping capacity or
decrease. Other aspects of vulnerability could also decrease,
especially if there are significant time intervals between suc-
cessive events in a cascade. This could, for example, help
facilitate a growth in community awareness and preparation.
This changing vulnerability within a network of hazard in-
teractions can be represented visually, as shown in Fig. 8,
where a series of three hazard events occur in succession and
an assumption is made that each hazard event will increase
subsequent levels of vulnerability. Before and between these
three hazard events, a representation of vulnerability is given,
where we illustrate the vulnerability magnitude as propor-
tional to the height of the rectangle. Figure 8 shows the dy-
namic nature of vulnerability as one progresses along a net-
work of interacting hazards. In this representation, we have
assumed that there are increases in vulnerability as the chain
of events progresses, but we note that this will not always be
the case. On the ground these changes to social and physical
vulnerability may be observed in different ways. For exam-
ple, buildings may have sustained significant damage so that
they are more likely to collapse during an aftershock. Hos-
pitals may be at maximum capacity following an earthquake
and therefore not able to respond effectively if a subsequent
typhoon results in further casualties. Injuries sustained by a
community during an earthquake may mean that they have
a reduced capacity to evacuate if a tsunami is subsequently
triggered.
These examples demonstrate that existing assessments of
vulnerability may rapidly become out of date following a
hazard event. The identification of possible interacting haz-
ard networks in a given region would allow improved plan-
ning of possible changes in vulnerability during successive
events. In turn, this could help to improve preparedness ef-
forts.
5.4.3 Allocation of resources for disaster risk reduction
In addition to the risk reduction benefits that come from the
last two points, understanding how chains of interacting haz-
ards are initiated and propagated may help determine how
to invest resources to minimise disruption should a specific
network of interacting hazards occur. Scientific and manage-
ment efforts can be focused on (i) preventing the initiation
of interaction networks and (ii) reduce or eliminate specific
interactions along the interacting hazard network. It may not
always be possible to prevent an initial primary hazard from
occurring, but sensible investments in structural and non-
structural mitigation measures may reduce the likelihood of
specific networks of hazard interactions propagating. While
we cannot currently prevent a tropical storm from forming
and hitting land, for example, measures may be taken to im-
prove drainage and reduce flooding, reinforce certain slopes
that are susceptible to failure, or improve urban management
to reduce structural collapses, urban fires and water contam-
ination.
6 Conclusions
In this research and commentary article, we have sought to
advance the understanding of enhanced multi-hazard frame-
works, which we believe to be of relevance to improved
Earth systems management. We advocate an approach that
goes beyond multi-layer single-hazard approaches to also
Earth Syst. Dynam., 7, 659–679, 2016 www.earth-syst-dynam.net/7/659/2016/
J. C. Gill and B. D. Malamud: Hazard interactions and interaction networks 677
Pre-d  isaster 
vulnerability 
Post-disaster 
vulnerability
Hazard
event (1)
Hazard
event (2)
Post-disaster 
vulnerability
Hazard
event (3)
Post-disaster 
vulnerability
Figure 8. Example of vulnerability changes within a network of hazard interactions (cascade). A representation of changing vulnerability
during a hazard cascade, where the magnitude of vulnerability is proportional to the size of the box. Following a disaster event, pressures
on society, infrastructure and coping capacity are likely to be increased, and thus the vulnerability of a community and its systems/assets to
further shocks or hazards may increase.
encompass interaction relationships and networks of inter-
actions (cascades). This study has described this integrated
approach, noting that to do otherwise could distort manage-
ment priorities, increase vulnerability to other spatially rel-
evant hazards or underestimate risk. The development of an
enhanced framework to assess and characterise interactions
and networks of interactions first required a description of
three principal groups of hazards/processes, including natu-
ral hazards, anthropogenic processes and technological haz-
ards/disasters. These three groups can interact in a range
of different ways, with three interaction relationships dis-
cussed in the context of this article: triggering relationships,
increased-probability relationships, and catalysis/impedance
of other hazard interactions. In addition to those circum-
stances where one stimulus triggers one response, it is highly
likely that more than one of these interactions can be joined
together to form a network of interactions, chain or cascade
event. We have developed enhanced frameworks to visualise
these interactions and networks of interactions (cascades) in
two different ways (hazard/process flow diagrams in Figs. 2,
3, 6 and 7, and hazard interaction matrices in Figs. 4 and 5).
These frameworks, visualisations and associated commen-
tary
i. reinforce the importance of enhanced multi-hazard ap-
proaches, integrating hazard interactions and networks
of interactions to better model observed dynamics of the
Earth system;
ii. offer a more holistic approach to assessing hazard po-
tential, helping to improve management of those aspects
of the Earth system that are relevant to disaster risk re-
duction;
iii. support the research community to consider future re-
search directions in the context of multi-hazard research
in regional settings.
Better characterisation and integration of interactions and
networks of interactions into multi-hazard methodologies
can contribute to an improved theoretical and practical un-
derstanding of hazards and disaster risk reduction.
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